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ABSTRACT
The Norwegian Armed Forces has a joint headquarters at the operational level. This paper argues that the National Joint Headquarters of Norway (NJHQ) contributes in a unique manner to the overall management of the Norwegian Armed Forces in its two main capacities of national defense and contributions to international operations. The paper describes the national security organization and states Norwegian interests and tasks to the military before engaging in a brief discussion of the origin of the operational level of war and the need for a headquarters at this level in Norway. Through a description of how the NJHQ operates up, down and laterally an understanding of how the NJHQ fills the operational level is developed. The paper ends with a discussion of alternatives and makes a few broad suggestions on how the headquarters can improve its effectiveness.
The Norwegian Armed Forces has a joint headquarters at the operational level.
This paper argues that the National Joint Headquarters of Norway (NJHQ) contributes in a unique manner to the overall management of the Norwegian Armed Forces in its two main capacities of national defense and contributions to international operations.
The paper describes the national security organization and states Norwegian interests and tasks to the military before engaging in a brief discussion of the origin of the operational level of war and the need for a headquarters at this level in Norway.
Through a description of how the NJHQ operates up, down and laterally an understanding of how the NJHQ fills the operational level is developed. The paper ends with a discussion of alternatives and makes a few broad suggestions on how the headquarters can improve its effectiveness.
THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL JOINT HEADQUARTERS OF NORWAY
On 21 August 2009 the National Joint Headquarters (NJHQ) was official opened in Bodø, Northern-Norway by Minister of Defense Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen. In her speech she emphasized the different roles for the NJHQ: situational awareness, conduct day to day operations, support and monitoring deployed forces, and plan and conduct major exercises, Home Land Security, and defense support of civilian authority.
She placed particular emphasis on the government's priority to the High North:
Primarily climate change, resource and energy issues are at the heart of the High North initiatives. Also in the North we may more clearly than elsewhere experience that civil challenges can assume security political character. It is in the High North that we can see increased competition for strategic resources. It is in the North we have unsettled boundary issues.
1
It is in the High North global climate change will make the extraction and transport of energy in the Arctic an even more central issue in the future. And we have no right to overlook the fact that an increasingly selfassertive Russia still concentrates much of its military force in our region. Since 2003 Norway has had an integrated Ministry of Defense (MOD) and DEFSTAFF. 5 At the time Norway established its joint headquarters, the headquarters had an independent role from the MOD and the DEFSTAFF. As a result of the integration and the transformation of the Armed Forces, the chain of command and its independent role have changed. Some may argue that the military domain and its chain of command has developed from a "professional military domain" to an area that in many ways is managed in a day to day fashion by the politicians like a political "hot spot" 6 . The changes can in part be explained by effects from new public management (NPM) reforms such as the introduction of management by objectives, performance management, and Balanced Scorecard (BSC). 7 In addition, a slow but necessary transformation of the Norwegian Armed Forces changed the size and the role of the command structure. The change is partly due to an evolution in the political attention to the field of defense and security politics as a result of the shift from anti-invasion defense planning to incident management. As a result of these developments, one could argue that today's military leadership seems to have "a great deal of responsibility but a minimum of power". The political aim of the integration of the MOD and the DEFSTAFF is to ensure a "better match between political decisions and their implementation". 10 The MOD is a European Union security policy are more aligned today than they were 10 years ago. 16 Norway has made most of the changes to align policies, with a comprehensive security focus replacing the territorial defense focus of the Cold War. Additionally, Norway understands the need for a combined civilian-military approach to security issues. Many of these changes have contributed to a smaller NJHQ with a more distinct civil-military relation. 17 Norway has a long term commitment to contribute resources to NATO, UN, EU, and other coalition operations, and defense and security initiatives. This supports the overall Norwegian defense and security priorities.
The geopolitical context is changing in Norway's near abroad and the implications will be felt in the NJHQ. Elements that are visible today include a global focus switching to Asia, the effects of national and global financial challenges, and a changing US policy towards Europe. At least two major issues can influence the NJHQ in the near term. First, it is possible that developments in the High North can lead to an increased attention to the region. Second, as NATO continues its post Cold War transformation it looks for new initiatives to strengthen its near abroad competence. shall contribute to achievement of the national objectives in support of the overall national interests. 20 The main purpose of the Armed Forces' is to contribute to the "security of the state, its people and the society, and to protect and promote our interests and values". 21 The various tasks given to the Armed Forces reflect the role (means and ways) of the Armed Forces in support of Norwegian national objectives (ends). In general terms the tasks of the Armed Forces are:
National tasks which, as a general rule, must be undertaken nationally and without Allied involvement:
Task 1: To ensure a good basis for national political and military decisionmaking through timely surveillance and intelligence.
Task 2: To uphold Norwegian sovereignty and sovereign rights. Tasks 1-6 will determine the development of the NAF's structure and force posture. 22 NJHQ was established to perform the tasks of the operational level of warfare in translating military strategy into activity. One of the headquarters' primary tasks is to provide connection between single activities and overall objectives. This paper argues that, even though the theory that first defined the operational level has its roots in war, the functions described are, in fact, being performed by the NJHQ today. It was the force-on-force operations, the concept is equally applicable to contemporary operations in which crisis resolution does not necessarily hinge on military success. It embraces a commander's ability to take a complex and often unstructured problem and provide sufficient clarity and logic (some of which is intuitive) to enable detailed planning and practical orders. It is realized through a combination of a commander's skill and the staff-assisted processes of Operational Design and Operational Management. At the same time he is the "primary advisor" for the CHOD in operational matters. 39 The NJHQ mission and implied tasks can be broken down into two distinct areas: the situation in and around Norway; and the Norwegian international engagement resulting in deployment of units for missions abroad. To cover these areas NJHQ transforms the intended strategic concept into orders to individual units.
In the land domain, COM NJHQ commands the Border Guard Battalion and His
Majesty the Kings Guards on their primary missions. 40 In addition he directs the eleven Home Guard Districts, tactical level headquarters equivalent to a regiment, with land, naval and air force elements. 41 In the air and maritime domains COM NJHQ assumes command over allocated forces in the framework of "Operation Norway," the overall plan for the defense of Norway's territorial integrity. 42 This may include a naval vessel on patrol in the Skagerrak or a Maritime Patrol Aircraft on a mission in the North Sea.
NJHQ directly supports training and readiness in the Air Force and Navy by assuming command over vessels and aircraft on training missions. Under normal circumstances NJHQ operates without activating tactical level commands, but tactical level commands like Norwegian Task Group or Brigade North may be activated, depending on the scope and complexity of a specific situation. The tactical level of command for the air domain is permanently integrated in NJHQ, in accordance with the principles of "centralized direction and decentralized execution". 43 NJHQ constantly interacts with the DEFSTAFF, the Services, and other supporting organizations to execute operations, plan and conduct national and multinational exercises, support and monitor out of country missions, and support defense activities in support of civil authorities.
44
NJHQ transforms the strategic tasks given in "Capable Force" to missions and orders, activities and initiatives through "Operation Norway." The Area of Responsibility for COM NJHQ covers the whole territory of Norway including islands, adjacent waters, and sovereign airspace, and is currently characterized as calm, stable, and peaceful. Defense support of civilian authority also crosses international borders. Sweden, Finland, Russia, Norway and other neighboring countries exercise civil emergency options, search and rescue, and other crisis scenarios. 52 The NJHQ has, as an operational headquarters, an important role in supporting the responsible government agencies or in being the partner headquarters for an institution in another country.
The NJHQ performs a variety of operational tasks that are supportive of each other and that support COM NJHQ in building and maintaining a professional headquarters. Different planning tasks enhance basic planning skills and contribute to the capability of the headquarters. At the same time logistical considerations and limitations from exercises give insight into real-life sustainment issues. Situation awareness, reporting procedures, tension and limitations must be mitigated. And the different "tactical successes must be transformed into … strategic successes". 53 NJHQ, a fairly small headquarters, tightly controlled by an integrated civilian-military strategic level in a politically prioritized region, is responsible for all aspects of executing the military strategy of Norway.
The last part of this paper will seek to discuss in broad terms three elements relative to the future of the operational level of war in Norway, and of NJHQ. The first issue is the location of the headquarters and the relevance of a separate operational level headquarters. The second issue is the ambition for a joint headquarters that performs its tasks by coordinating vertically and horizontally to achieve a whole of government approach. The third issue deals with ways to improve the quality of the headquarters.
NJHQ has demonstrated its efficiency, but its existence as an independent headquarters and the location of the headquarters has been under debate. The location of NJHQ in Bodø is a double edged sword. The headquarters is a good distance away from most other government agencies, the Services and higher headquarters. To some extent this can be mitigated with modern technology, though the distance from the populated part of the country remains a challenge for the headquarters. argued that NJHQ was and is defined by more than those factors. 63 In addition to its role as a headquarters, NJHQ is in itself an element of Norwegian defense and security politics. The location of the headquarters is an expression of Norwegian commitment and resolve to remain a responsible steward and a credible actor in the High North. Today NJHQ does not operate in a "politics-free zone" but presents itself as a well-integrated modern government institution actively coordinating and contributing, horizontally and vertically. 64 As we have seen in the description of how NJHQ works, who it supports, and how it ties strategy to activity, NJHQ has many roles. The NJHQ has geographical as well as functional responsibilities for the Joint Force in Norway. It performs all of the functions of operational art described by Kubban - 27 February, 2012) .
